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Abstract
Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRM) can be used in power markets
to overtake market failures, reaching security of supply. However, investment
in capacity is a dynamic process, that depends on the evolution of prices and
costs overtime. In our paper we study the capacity remuneration value through
a CRM depending on three possible different technologies that participate to
the market: a Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) source; a thermal efficient
plant (i.e. Combine Cycle Gas Turbine) and a brown plant (i.e. coal). We shall
see that these three types of capacities can be framed by means of a common
theoretical framework, whose level of complexity increases as the uncertainty
rises, moving from the simplest scheme (VRE technology) to the most complex
one (coal power plant). For these different technological provisions, we consider
how to evaluate them focusing on their investment value by adopting a stochastic
approach; we first provide a theoretical framework and then sensitivity analysis
and calibration results. We show that for all three technology considered the
effect of the CRM is to cap the firm revenues and as consequence it decreases
their value.
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1

Introduction

The energy transition challenge calls for a rise of the share of power for final energy usages,
as well as an increase of power generation from renewable energy sources. In Europe,
for instance, the fit for 55 package of the European Commission prescribes that by 2030,
65% of electricity in Europe will have to be generated by renewable energy sources, which
implies the need to install roughly 450 GW of new renewable capacity. 1 The rising
penetration of renewable energy sources however impacts on the security of supply risk
for power system, due to the increase of non-controllable small scale Variable Renewable
Energy sources (VRE) which implies higher balancing need, as well as higher price volatility
(Bonaldo et al. (2022)). At the same time, controllable back-up capacity, which is mostly
supplied by thermal power plants due to the limited impact of power storage,2 faces reduced
incentives to remain on line or be built due to the rise of investment risks. Thus, there seems
to be a trade-off between the rising need of power supplied by VRE and the security of
supply challenges that this poses to power systems. A possible way to reconcile the trade-off
calls for the implementation of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRM) that can favour
investments. Indeed, it is a well-known theoretical result of the market design theory that in
a first-best world, power markets with CRM provide the same optimal level of adequacy of
energy markets without CRM, the so-called energy-only markets (Creti and Fontini (2019)).
However, load rigidity, increasing risks and difficulties in assessing the value for consumers
of the energy shed (the so-called Value of Loss Load, VOLL) can justify the implementation
of CRM (Joskow and Tirole (2007), Joskow (2008), Joskow and Wolfram (2012), Cramton
et al. (2013)). There exists several types of CRMs: capacity payments, which are payments
for capacity administratively set; capacity auctions, procurement auctions through which
the System Operator (SO)3 remunerates a given amount of generation capacity; reliability
options, contracts sold by power producers to the SO in exchange for a premium, that
obliges the seller of the reliability option to supply energy to the power market and return
to the SO the extra revenues that they obtain from prices rising above a predetermined
level; capacity obligation, which is the obligation for load serving entities to hold enough
capacity to serve the load; strategic reserves, which are power plants withdrew from the
1

Source: https://windeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/files/policy/position-papers/
20210317-WindEurope-Fit-for-55-position-paper.pdf
2
Clearly, this depends on each specific power system. Power storage at present is mostly provided
by means of pumped hydro power storage, due to the high cost and limited capabilities of chemical
storage through batteries. Thus, systems that can rely on a high penetration of pumped storage
have comparatively less need of back-up capacity. It should also be considered that demand side
response can reduce the need to provide thermal back-up capacity, even though at present its role
appears to be limited.
3
In this paper we denote generically as the SO the entity that balances the grid in the short-run
and has the responsibility of ensuring security of supply (alone or shared with some other entities).
In the USA, it is the Independent System Operators (ISOs), in Europe the Transmission System
Operators (TSOs).
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market and divested to the SO, that uses it whenever there is a security of supply threat.
In all those cases, the effect of the introduction of a CRM is to impose de facto a price
cap to power market: the increase of capacity rises power supplied, which implies that
the electricity price does not spike to the level of the willingness to pay for the first unit
of power not served but remains to the marginal cost of the last unit of power supplied.4
Therefore, the marginal cost of the last plant dispatched, i.e., the marginal plant, provides
the effective price cap of markets with CRM.
Even if CRM can be introduced as a response to the increasing challenges posed to
power systems by the energy transition, they have consequences for the evolution of the
electricity system. The investments that they bring about have expected life-times and
need to be amortized on a sufficiently long time scale. Therefore, the capacity that is
brought in line thanks to the CRM, even if it can provide the optimal level of security of
supply, i.e., providing enough energy when needed (with the consequence of capping energy
price, as explained), it also introduces a rigidity in the power system, by fixing the set of
power plants that are brought in line or maintained active. This in turns implies that the
power system loses the possibility to gain from investments’ cost reductions, accruing for
instance from a technological evolution. In other words, CRMs imply a loss of flexibility
of investing in the future under different circumstances. Thus a different trade-off arises
between security of supply and the benefit of technological evolution. In this paper, we
consider this trade-off studying the value of the investment in different types of power
capacity that are incentivized by the CRM. Indeed, a CRM can be technology specific
or technology neutral. In the first case, the capacity remuneration can be reserved to a
specific type of investments. Examples of these are capacity auctions reserved to VRE,
to Demand Side Response (DSR) or strategic reserves targeted to specific types of power
plants. It is also possible that the CRM regulation prescribes such a broad range of
technical prerequisite for the capacity that different technologies can participate. In this
case, the technology that is remunerated is the one with the least capacity cost per unit
of power supplied.5 In any case, depending on the cost structure of a given power system,
or on the specific CRM regulation, it is well possible that different technologies receive
distinct incentives. This has key consequences for the energy transition. Depending on the
incentives and the market design of the CRM, it is possible that carbon neutral technologies
are favoured or disadvantaged vs. hydrocarbon-fired plants. Evaluating to what extent a
CRM can favour or not the energy transition taking into account explicitly the rigidity in
the technology evolution induced by the CRM is therefore of the utmost importance to
assess the compatibility of a CRM with the energy transition. This is the purpose of this
4

Except for those few hours in which installing extra capacity would imply such a rise in the
cost, well above the willingness to pay for those extra hours of energy, that would not be optimal
to generate power but it would be more efficient to shed load. This is the optimal level of load
shedding. See any textbook of electricity market for this, e.g. Creti and Fontini (2019), Ch. 9.
5
This has been the case, for instance, of the Italian capacity auction of Reliability Options held
in year 2019, in which the awarded capacity was all from gas-fired plants.

3

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

5

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1371 [2022]

paper. In order to distinguish between capacity that favour energy transition and capacity
that can lock-in the technological evolution, we consider three possible types of capacity
participation to CRM:
1. a capacity that enables supplying firm energy from VRE coupled with an efficient
Energy Storage System (namely, energy always available when needed without any
unavailability risk);
2. a thermal efficient capacity, for instance a Combine Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT)
power plant that represent the state-of-the art of the efficiency at the time of the
investment and that will never be surpassed during the life period of the CRM;
3. a capacity that, albeit cheaper at the time of the investment, faces a random marginal
cost of generation, that might eventually become more costly than some other
installed technology. An example could be a coal fired power plant, for which the
generation cost depends on the primary energy price, as well as on the cost of emission
abatement or compensation which can increase the cost of power generation.
We shall see that these three types of capacities can be framed within a common
theoretical framework, whose level of complexity increases as the uncertainty rises, going
from the simplest scheme (the firm VRE) to the most complex one (coal plant with fully
random costs). For these different technological provisions, we consider how to evaluate
them focusing on their Net Present Value (NPV), adopting a stochastic approach. We first
provide a theoretical framework, then we apply the theoretical findings to real markets using
plausible time series. In order to measure the value of the investment, we shall calibrate the
model using figures from the Italian market, assuming that the random cost component is
give by coal in the third model. Nevertheless, we highlight that our theoretical results are
valid even if different time series are considered, provided that the stochastic underlying
processes follow the assumed behaviors. Finally, in order to see the consequences of the
CRM for the energy transition, we shall measure the impacts of the investments under
the CRM by means of a social welfare function that shall include both the value of the
investments and the social cost of the related carbon emissions.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly summarise the relevant literature.
Section 3 address the investment problem under a CRM: the economic dispatching principle
of competitive energy market is presented as well as the different sources of uncertainty
faced by a power plant investor. Section 4 introduces multi-period valuation models under
the assumption that plants’ revenues and costs evolve stochastically, introducing the three
models characterized by an increasing level of complexity. In Section 5 we fit the stochastic
processes used by means of empirical data and then estimate the models’ parameters
considered. Models’ calibration and sensitivity analyses are also provided and discussed.
Section 6 presents the results of the evaluation of each model relating it to the energy
transition, followed by final remarks and suggestions for futures studies. Proofs of the
Propositions and time series analysis are in the Appendix.

4
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2

Literature review

There exists a vast literature on CRMs that focuses on their need and effectiveness as
investment incentives to deliver security of supply (Cramton et al. (2013), Spees et al.
(2013), Roques (2008)) and on specific markets’ analyses (United Kingdom Bhagwat et al.
(2017), Germany Neuhoff et al. (2016), Ozdemir et al. (2013), Italy Mastropietro et al.
(2018) , Ireland and others Hancher et al. (2015), Poland Przemyslaw et al. (2021), the
United States Lin and Vatani (2017), Bowring (2013), and other markets throughout
the world Galetovic et al. (2015), Ashokkumar et al. (2020)). A smaller set of works
analyze quantitatively the option value of the power capacity. Andreis et al. (2020)
provide semi explicit formulae to evaluate the option value of a Reliability Option under
different assumptions for the underlying stochastic process of the electricity prices. Sezgen
et al. (2007) evaluate the options which are implicit in DSR mechanisms. Burger et al.
(2004), through a Monte Carlo approach, evaluated capacity as a bundle of call options
on hourly prices. Other authors focused on the relationship between electricity security
of supply and CRM. In Khalfallah (2009), the author analyzed two different incentive
mechanisms, i.e. reliability contracts and capacity obligations, and compared them to
the energy-only market. Then, a backward stochastic dynamic programming method is
applied to solve the investment problem. The model allows to identify at which load
and fuel price levels it is optimal to invest in a new power plant. In Fraunholz et al.
(2021), the authors evaluates how the specific design of a CRM can create a bias against
electricity security of supply and thereby affect future technology mix as well as long-term
generation adequacy. In Khan et al. (2018), the authors investigated how pumped storage
and demand side response should be remunerated by a capacity markets. They present
a hybrid optimization model with agents making investment decisions to maximize future
profits provide simulated results. Askeland et al. (2017) set up a linear complementary
model to study both an energy-only market and a market with CRM. For each of the two
market configurations, different storage possibilities are analyzed, by means of lead-acid
batteries and pumped storage are analyzed. The authors find that batteries can be a costeffective alternative to thermal power generation to serve the peak load and contribute to
a capacity reserve requirement. However, none of the studies considered evaluate explicitly
the role of technological lock-in induced by the CRM or perform a comparative evaluation
of the different technologies to deliver security of supply, as we do here.

3

The investment problem

Operating a power plant in the electricity market brings about several sources of risk. A
first source of risk derives from the economic dispatching principle of competitive energy
market. This implies that the price of energy is given by the marginal cost of the marginal
technology, i.e., the technology that is providing the last unit of energy to serve the load,
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as long as there is some spare capacity, namely, there exist the possibility to increase
generation should the load rise. When the system is running short of capacity, that is, it is
using all of its capacity, the energy price spikes to the value of the first unit of energy not
served, the so-called Value of Lost Load (VOLL).6 If there are CRM, the latter affect the
dynamics of the power prices. If a CRM provides (optimal) security of supply this means
that there is enough capacity and thus the would be no price spiking to the VOLL. The
power price would be effectively capped at the level of the marginal cost of the marginal
plant (the plant with the highest marginal cost), whenever the system would have seen a
spike in the energy price to the VOLL had the CRM not being in place. This is the price
cap effect of the CRM7 . When an investor invest in capacity under a CRM, obtains ex
ante a remuneration for it, the capacity premium, but gives up the extra profits that it
would have faced when the system would have gone to the VOLL because of the shortage of
capacity, but does not, thanks to the CRM (the price cap effect). Thus, the investor bears
two sources of uncertainty: the uncertainty due to the dynamic of the energy price, and the
uncertainty due to the dynamic of the price cap effect. This latter depends in turn on the
load and on the marginal cost of the least efficient unit installed (the marginal technology),
which will be called in when the system is running short of capacity. The investment under
a CRM framework thus effectively implies a further source of uncertainty for an investor:
at the time of the investment, it has to foresee the likelihood that it will be dispatched in
the energy market, which depend on the comparison between its own marginal cost and
both the forecasted energy prices and the forecasted price cap effect. In other words, when
it invests, it needs to foresee to what extent it is efficient at that time and will remain
such throughout the entire life-cycle of its investment. This clearly depends on its own
actual cost, on how its own generation costs will evolve overtime and on the technological
development which will affect the system costs and therefore will determine the evolution
of the price cap effect and on the duration of the CRM mechanisms. The longer the time
commitment of the capacity, the higher the risk that eventually the power plant that it
has been invested on will be overtaken by more efficient plants, which implies loosing the
supermarginal operating profits that benefit inframarginal technologies.
There can be other sources of uncertainty when an investor chooses to invest in power
generation, namely, the one accruing from the capital costs and the uncertainty about
the capacity remuneration itself8 . In this paper, we shall neglect this, assuming that
investment costs in a given power plant are know, even if they differ across technologies.
Also the amount of the CRM is known. We focus on the uncertainty that comes from
6

In real life, before going to the VOLL the system would see some security margin constraints
violated. The price would spike (at the level of the value of the first unit of energy not served)
due to the system security violation. This implies that the price would tend to the VOLL, without
reaching it.
7
See Creti and Fontini (2019) for further explanations.
8
This will be the case, for instance, of capacity auctions, that are run after that a given
investment has been brought in line.
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market operation, namely, the activity of running the power plant and selling electricity in
the market, under the CRM scheme, assuming that the investment remains operating with
a sufficiently long time scale. For the sake of simplicity, we shall treat it as a permanent
commitment to generate power, i.e., we assume an infinite horizon.9 We shall consider three
different technologies. They can be seen as a model with an increasing level of uncertainty
about market operation. The first one is a simplified framework in which the investor bears
only the power price risk, since it has null marginal cost. This implies that the investor
can be sure that throughout the life-time of the plant it will never become the marginal
technology.10 Such a model represents a firm capacity supplied by a VRE. In general, VRE
are characterized by limited controllability, since typically the investor does not control the
supply of the primary energy source they recall on. The guiding principle of CRMs is to
incentivise capacity that generates energy when needed, and for this, often penalties for
unavailabilities are set or technical requirements are introduced such that only controllable
capacity that can be planned in advanced can participate to the CRM. A possible solution
for VRE to provide such a capacity is coupling it to some storage facility, which would
allow it to get rid of the cycle of availability of the primary energy (as it is for instance for
the case of photo-voltaic plants) or eliminate the forecast risk (as it is the case of the wind
power supply), as long as the storage facility is large and reliable enough. Not all types
of storage facilities could provide this. For instance, lithium-ion batteries typically have
limited capacity supply, specific and constrained charging cycles, are subject to decay and
have short expected life-time. Thus they might not be suitable to participate to the CRM,
in particular for those CRMs that require a long-term commitment. New forms of storage
technologies are emerging that can get rid of these limitations. They are termed Long
Duration Energy Storage (LDES) means.11 Several technologies allow to privide these
kind of service. In a nutshell, they allow converting electricity into another vector that
provides a stock of energy stored, and which can be easily inverted to generate again the
flow of energy. Examples of such vectors are compressed air, heat, hydrogen of chemical
components stored in Redox Flow batteries. This is the type of storage that we have in
mind. In this model, we are assuming that a storage facility coupled with VRE exists, that
can provide long-term energy storage with no decay, for any possible capacity-energy ratio
9

Even if this is not what occurs in real world, it can be representative of those CRM that imply
a long-run time commitment, such as the 15 years-long time commitment of the Italian auctions
for new capacity held in year 2019.
10
For simplicity we are assuming that even in the case of null system price it has priority
dispatching. Moreover, we are not considering here the case of negative marginal price. Such
an assumption is not too restrictive in this framework, since normally CRM are implemented when
there is a security of supply risk, which implies that the system is short in capacity and thus the
system marginal price is positive. In other words, a negative price would imply a system long in
capacity, for which there would not be any need of a CRM.
11
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/net-zero-powerlong-duration-energy-storage-for-a-renewable-grid
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required, which implies that charging and discharging cycles can be planned in advance
without any risk of security of supply, as it is the case, for instance for the Vanadium
Redox Flow Batteries (Bonaldo and Poli (2022)) and with no unavailability risk. Thus,
the firm VRE capacity can be conceived as equivalent to a thermal power plant with two
main differences: no marginal cost of power supply and possibly a larger investment cost.
Recall that a CRM that provides (optimal) security of supply implies capping effectively
the energy price at the marginal cost of the marginal plant. Given that the marginal cost
of the firm VRE is null, we suppose that the marginal plant under these circumstances
would be represented by some other technology, for instance, a thermal power plant. Thus,
we shall refer to this marginal cost of the marginal plant as the price cap effect, having in
mind that it is effectively the cost of the primary energy fuel that is being generated at
the margin when the system is getting short of reserve capacity. This is the first model we
shall consider.
A first degree of complexity is added when the power capacity has a positive generation
cost. This implies two further levels of uncertainty: one given by the evolution of its own
cost of power generation which affect revenues; the other one by the price cap effect. Due
to this, it can be that overtime the own generation cost rise so much that the plant will
become the marginal one, even if it was not such at the time of the investment. The
first source of uncertainty derives from the price risk, the second one is indeed a quantity
risk. For the sake of simplicity, we first rule out the latter, assuming that at the time of
the investment the investor is sure that even if its own cost will change overtime, there
will always be some other power plant whose marginal cost will be higher than its own
one. Therefore, it will always be dispatched. For instance, this could be the case of a
system which already has installed some thermal power capacity, with a sufficiently long
expected life, and in which the new investment is using the same technology but with an
advantage in terms of efficiency. In this case, the investor can be sure that its own plant will
always be less costly than those other plants. Clearly, to be realistic such an assumption
would need to take into account other parameters as well, such as the likelihood that those
other plants go off-line earlier than the new investment, or that overtime new efficient
plant come in line and crowd it out the investment. We neglect these possibilities here
for the sake of simplicity, and focus on an investment that does not reasonably see any
quantity risk accruing from the price cap effect. To help framing this case, we shall refer
to it as the investment in an efficient Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) plant in a
system which is largely gas-based. Finally, we shall consider a technology whose marginal
cost is random and that might eventually be displaced by some other more efficient new
entrant. The investor therefore will bear three sources of risk, the electricity price risk,
its own generation cost risk and the (quantity) risk of becoming marginal. In order to
derive explicit solutions, we shall assume that the random price and the random cost of
the investor are represented by independently distributed random variables. Clearly, in real
markets this might not be the case, For instance, the power price might depend on the cost
of the primary energy if the cost of power generated by hydrocarbon can be passed-through

8
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to power prices.12 We do not consider this aspect here, and focus on a capacity which has
a positive marginal cost, which might eventually be displaced by some other power supply
in the merit order, but whose cost dynamics is not correlated to the system marginal price
one. An example of this can be provided by power generation from coal. For these plants,
at the time of the investment the operating cost of power generation might be cheaper
than the system marginal cost (where the latter can be given for instance, by gas fired
plants). However, these investments bear the risk of its own cost dynamics, which depends
also on the regulatory and technological evolution. This implies that overtime coal plants
might be crowded out because of the relative dynamic of its own cost and the ones of the
other technologies. Nevertheless, we highlight that this is just an example that will help us
framing the model and providing plausible figures for the value of the investment. To show
all possible cases, we shall also consider different figures for the random cost component,
which might be take as proxies for different technologies.

4
4.1

Analytical framework
Model 1: VRE coupled with an efficient ESS

In the first model we have two sources of uncertainty, that we frame as stochastic variables:
the day-ahead electricity price, Pt , and the price cap effect that we represent as a random
variable depending on the marginal cost of the (least efficient) marginal technology (i.e.
the technology with the highest marginal cost) Ct . The CRM is awarded ex ante to the
capacity, being it either administratively set or derived as the equilibrium price of some
market mechanism, such as a capacity auction. We do not focus here on how to calculate it
or to let emerge its fair value (See Andreis et al. (2020) and references therein) and simply
assume that it correspond to a given installment K (the capacity premium) expressed in
terms of money per capacity per year, attributed ex-ante to the capacity. In addition,
since the capacity premium is paid in annuities throughout the whole commitment period,
without losing generality, we assume that is paid in full at the beginning of the commitment
period.13
As mentioned, in this model there are no variable costs of power generation. The Net
Present Value are simply the difference between the Investment costs, net of the premium,
and the flow of operating profits accruing from selling energy in the power market, which
correspond to the revenues, being the operating cost null. The operating profits, however
are influenced by the existence of the CRM. In particular, two regime arises. Whenever
12

There exist a large literature on the estimate of electricity costs pass-through, that we cannot
review here. See for instance Caporin et al. (2021) and references therein.
13
Similarly, we do not consider the lag-time that usually exists between the awarding of the
premium and the effective delivery of capacity, and similarly assume that new investments occur
instantaneously.
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the system is not tight (i.e., there is enough spare capacity), the price cap effect of the
CRM is not binding and the electricity price is below the marginal cost of the least efficient
technology installed (in the sense of the technology with the highest marginal cost). This
defines the regime where Pt < Ct . Another regime arises when the system would have
experienced a load shedding had the CRM not being in place. The latter makes sure that
there is at the margin enough capacity, and thus the price is given by the marginal cost of
the (least efficient) marginal technology. It is the price cap effect, which becomes binding
when Pt ≥ Ct . In Figure (1) are represented revenues for this technology.

Figure 1: The green area represent the operating profits for a firm capacity supplied
by a VRE under the existence of the CRM. The x-axis corresponds to time t, the
y-axis are revenues, measured in Euro/MWh. The red line represents the marginal
costs of the marginal technology, Ct ; the blue line represents the day-ahead electricity
prices Pt . The vertical dashed lines identify the regimes of the value function, as
described by equation (6).

The instantaneous operating profits at time t ≥ 0 for the investment in the firm VRE
capacity can be written as:
πtV RE = min(Pt , Ct )

(1)

or, more specifically:
πtV RE

(
Ct
=
Pt

if Pt ≥ Ct
if Pt < Ct

(2)
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We assume that the day-ahead electricity price Pt and the price cap effect Ct are
stochastic and follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM): 14
dPt
= µP Pt dt + σP Pt dWtP with P0 = P
Pt

(3)

dCt
= µc Ct dt + σc Ct dWtC with C0 = C
Ct

(4)

where µP and µc are drifts of the two processes, σP and σC are the volatility parameters,
and dWtP and dWtC are the increments of a Wiener process.15
The static picture of revenues can be extended to a dynamic (multi-period) setup in
order to calculate the expected net present value of the project (NPV). The latter is just
the difference between the (deterministic) investment costs16 net of the capacity premium,
i.e. I V RE − K, and the expected flow of operating profits accruing from operating the
plant and selling electricity in the market. The present value of the latter is thus given by
the following equation:
∞

ˆ
V V RE (P, C) = E0  min(Pt , Ct )e−rt dt
(5)
0

where E0 (·) is the expectation operator taken with respect to the information at t = 0 and
r is the discount rate.
Standard stochastic dynamic programming methods allows obtaining a close form
solution fot the value function V V RE (P, C) distinguishing the case in which P ≥ C or
14

The GBM is largely used in the field of Real Options and renewable energy (see the literature
review provided by Kozlova (2017) Kozlova (2017)). Note that also other process, such as a
simple Brownian motion (neither arithmetic nor geometric) can represent the main features of
the electricity prices (see Borovkova and Schmeck (2017) Borovkova and Schmeck (2017)). Andreis
et al. (2020) Andreis et al. (2020) study how to calculate values of CRM depending on different
underlying stochastic processes of the power prices. They show that even though the GBM does
not provide a full representation of the electricity price dynamics, it provides a good approximation
that enables deriving explicit pricing formulae for the capacity value. Since the aim of our work
is to derive closed-form solutions, in order to investigate in depth the impact of CRM on the
investment value, we adhere to the perspective provided by Andreis et al. (2020) and adopt the
GBM hypothesis accordingly.
15
We further assume that Pt and Ct are not correlated, i.e., E(dWtP , dWtC ) = 0. Such an
assumption is plausible, since Ct is the marginal cost of the least efficient unit installed, while Pt is
either the marginal cost of the plant that is providing power when there is some spare capacity, or
the marginal utility of the first unit that would not be served if the system runs short of capacity.
16
From now onward, all the superscripts of the parameters refer to the value of the parameter
for that specific model, unless differently specified. Thus, for instance, the investment cost for the
VRE is denoted as I V RE .

11

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

13

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1371 [2022]

P < C. Provided that r − µP > 0 and r − µC > 0, the following Proposition summarizes
the solution of (5), hereafter we drop the time index when this does not cause confusion.
Proposition 1.The NPV of the investment in the case of firm capacity supplied by VRE
is:
ΠV RE (P, C) = −I V RE + K + V V RE (P, C)
with:
V V RE (P, C) =

(
V1V RE =
V2V RE

=

C
r−µC
P
r−µP

+ AV RE C 1+β1 P −β1

for P ≥ C

B V RE C 1+β2 P −β2

for P < C

+

(6)

Where:
AV RE

=

B V RE

=

(r − µC ) + β2 (µP − µC )
(β2 − β1 )(r − µP )(r − µC )
(µP − µC )β1 + (r − µC )
(β2 − β1 )(r − µP )(r − µC )

and

β1 = −

β2 = −

1 µC − µP
+ 2
2 σC
+ σP2



1 µC − µP
+ 2
2 σC
+ σP2



s
+
s
−

1 µC − µP
+ 2
2 σC
+ σP2

2

1 µC − µP
+ 2
2 σC
+ σP2

2

(7)
(8)

+

2(r − µC )
2 + σ2 > 0
σC
P

(9)

+

2(r − µC )
2 + σ2 < 0
σC
P

(10)

Poof: See Appendix A
Note that V V RE (P, C) is made of two regimes. The first one occurs when the price cap
C
effect is binding, i.e. P ≥ C. In this regime, the term r−µ
indicates the discounted sum of
C
the expected operating profits if the price cap effect was binding forever. The second one
corresponds to the case in which the price effect is not binding, i.e. P < C. The discounted
P
sum of the expected profits if this regime was to remain active forever is given by r−µ
.
P
−β
V
RE
1+β
−β
V
RE
1+β
1
1
2
2
represent the value
P
and A
C
P
On the contrary, the terms B
C
of the possibility, due to the existence of the CRM, that when the plant is under one regime
it falls into the other, i.e., that the price price cap effect becomes binding when it is not or
that a reduction of the electricity price below the price cap is observed when the price cap
effect is binding.
We refer to these values as the CRM-induced switching values, or just switching values
in brief. The sign of these switching values depend on the sign of the constants AV RE and
B V RE , which in turns, depend on µP , µC , β1 and β2 . In Section 5.2 below we discuss their
value, sign and present a sensitivity analysis with respect to r − µP and r − µC . We shall
also calibrate the level of the value function V V RE , and show how it changes depending on
the drifts, µP and µC , and the volatilities σP and σC .

12
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4.2

Model 2: Efficient CCGT

In this section we deal with the case of a capacity which has a positive marginal cost of
generating power. This implies two further levels of uncertainty for a given plant: one given
by the evolution of its own power generation cost , and a second one accruing from the price
cap effect. Recall that because of the latter, some other more efficient plant might become
the marginal one in some hours, crowding-out the power supplied by the current plant. We
separate these two cases, and consider first just the possible uncertainty accruing from the
own cost evolution (and from the dynamics of the electricity price) without including the
risk of becoming the marginal or super-marginal technology because of the evolution of the
other plants’ costs. In other words, we shall assume that the investor will be sure that,
after the investment, its own plant will always be more efficient than some other plant that
is installed and therefore has no risk of being crowded-out in the merit order. This will be
framed in the model assuming that there is a cost of generating power Bt , but the plant is
always more efficient than the plant that will be the marginal one and that will determine
the price cap effect, i.e. Bt = αCt , with α ∈ (0, 1).
Note that now three regimes might arise. The first one, as before, is when the price cap
effect of the CRM is binding. In this case, the operating profits derive from the difference
between the price obtained by selling energy in the power market, which is capped by
the price cap effect at the level of Ct , and the own cost of generation αCt . The second
regime occurs when the price cap effect is not binding, thus operating profits derive from
the system marginal price Pt , minus the operating costs; this is such only if the price is
above the marginal cost of power generation. Finally, whenever it occurs that the system
marginal price is so low that the plant cannot recover its own operating cost, we suppose
that it can avoid generating power (e.g., remain idle and not bidding in the power market)
without any penalty17 . Thus in this third regime the plant would not have any operating
profits. Figure 2 represents the operating profits for this type of technology.
17

Note that such an assumption is not in contrast with the assumption that selling energy is
compulsory for plants that have received CRM, since such a low level of the price implies that there
would not be any risk of security of supply. A sufficient condition for this would simply be betting
in the day-ahead market at the own marginal cost.
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Figure 2: The green area represent the operating profits for a firm capacity supplied
by a CCGT power plant under the existence of the CRM. The x-axis corresponds
to time t, the y-axis are Euro/MWh. The red line represents the marginal costs of
the marginal technology, Ct ; the blue line represents the day-ahead electricity prices
Pt ; the cost of generating power from the CCGT is given by the purple curve αCt .
The vertical dashed lines identify the regimes of the value function, as described by
equation (14).
The instantaneous revenue at time t ≥ 0 for the investment in the CCGT can be written
as:
πtCCGT = max[min(Pt , Ct ) − αCt , 0]

(11)

or, more specifically:

πtCCGT



Ct − αCt
= Pt − αCt


0

if Pt ≥ Ct
if αCt < Pt < Ct
if Pt < αCt

(12)

Note that in the transition from one regime to the other it is assumed that it is not
possible to jump from the first regime to the third and vice versa without entering into the
second one. The expected value of the operating profits is now:
∞

ˆ
V CCGT (P, C) = E0  max[min(Pt , Ct ) − αCt , 0]e−rt dt
(13)
0

14

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1371

16

Bonaldo et al.: The Energy Transition and the Value of Capacity Remuneration

Following the same procedure as before, we can calculate the value function V CCGT (P, C)
within the three different regimes, i.e. when P ≥ C, when αC < P < C and finally when
P < αC. The following Proposition summarizes the solution of (13):
Proposition 2. The NPV of the investment in the case of capacity supplied by CCGT
is:
ΠCCGT (P, C) = −I CCGT + K + V CCGT (P, C)
with

CCGT (P, C)

V1
V CCGT (P, C) = V2CCGT (P, C)

 CCGT
V3
(P, C)

for P ≥ C
for αC < P < C
for P < αC

(14)

and
(1 − α)C
+ ACCGT
C 1+β1 P −β1
1
r − µC
αC
P
V2CCGT (P, C) =
−
+ ACCGT
C 1+β1 P −β1 + B2CCGT C 1+β2 P −β2
2
r − µP
r − µC
V3CCGT (P, C) = B3CCGT C 1+β2 P −β2
V1CCGT (P, C) =

(15)
(16)
(17)

Where the four constants are given by:

ACCGT
1
ACCGT
2
B2CCGT
B3CCGT

(r − µC ) + β2 (µP − µC )
(1 − αβ1 +1 )
(β2 − β1 )(r − µP )(r − µC )
(r − µC ) + β2 (µP − µC ) β1 +1
= −
α
(β2 − β1 )(r − µP )(r − µC )
(r − µC ) + β1 (µP − µC )
=
(β2 − β1 )(r − µP )(r − µC )
(r − µC ) + β1 (µP − µC )
=
(1 − αβ2 +1 )
(β2 − β1 )(r − µP )(r − µC )

=

(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)

and β1 and β2 are given by (9) and (10) respectively.
Proof: See Appendix B.

In Equations (15) and (16) the investment value is composed of two components in each
regime. The first one given by the expected discounted flow of operating profits if the value

15
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is bound to remain in that regime forever, and the second part is the switching value of
falling into the other regimes. However, differently from equation (56), there are now two
switching values when the plant is in regime two: the electricity price can rise, making the
price cap effect binding, i.e., entering into regime one; or the electricity price falls below
the marginal cost of the efficient CCGT, i.e., entering into the third regime. The value of
the third regime (17) is however given only by the switching value. As in this regime the
power plant is idle due to costs that are higher than revenues, the switching value is a call
option – or the possibility to re-start the electricity production if things would change in
the future.
Note also that there is a sort of symmetry with respect to Model 1:
ACCGT
1
ACCGT
2
B2CCGT
B3CCGT

= AV RE (1 − αβ1 +1 )

(22)

V RE β1 +1

= −A
= B

V RE

= B

V RE

α

(23)
(24)

(1 − α

β2 +1

)

(25)

i.e. the Model 2 collapes to Model 1 when α = 0.
In Section 5.2 we shall discuss the signs of the four constants ACCGT
, ACCGT
, B2CCGT
1
2
and B3CCGT , and present a sensitivity analysis w.r.t. the drift parameters. We shall also
calibrate the level of the value function V CCGT , and show how it changes depending on
the drifts, µP and µC , and the volatilities σP and σC .

4.3

Model 3: coal power plant

In the most general model we assume that all three variables Pt , Ct and Bt are stochastic,
with the law of motion of Pt given by Equation (3), Ct by Equation (4) and Bt given by:18
dBt
= µB Bt dt + σB Bt dWtB
Bt

with B0 = B

(26)

Now, there can be an inversion in the merit order such that the investment considered
might become the marginal technology and be affected by the price cap. As before three
regimes arise for the revenues: when the price cap is binding, when it is not binding and
the plant is active, which means that the revenues accruing from selling the electricity are
higher than the own power generation costs, and when the plant is off. The latter case
however can arise for two reasons. Either because the revenues deriving from the power
prices would be lower than the cost of power generation, as before, or because the price
cap itself changes becoming lower than the own marginal cost. In other words, the own
18

We assume that Bt is not correlated with Pt and Ct , i.e.
E(dWtB , dWtC ) = 0.

E(dWtB , dWtP ) = 0. and

16
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marginal costs might become so high that the plant is crowded out by all other existing
plants, even the ones that were more costly before, and thus it is not dispatched anymore.
When one of these two states occurs, the plant remains idle. In Figure (Figure 3) are
represented the operating profits for such a technology.

Figure 3: The green area represent the operating profits for a firm capacity supplied
by a Coal power plant under the existence of the CRM. The x-axis corresponds
to time t, the y-axis are Euro/MWh. The red line represents the marginal costs
of the marginal technology, Ct ; the blue line represents the day-ahead electricity
prices Pt ; the cost of generating power from the coal plant, Bt , has its own specific
stochastic path. The grey dashed lines identify the four regimes of the value function
as described by equation (30).
The instantaneous operating profits from the investment in this model is:
πtCOAL = max[min(Pt − Bt , Ct − Bt ), 0]

(27)

or, more specifically:

πtCOAL



Ct − Bt
= Pt − Bt


0

if Pt − Bt ≥ Ct − Bt
if Pt − Bt < Ct − Bt
if min(Pt − Bt , Ct − Bt ) < 0

(28)

The expected value of the future discounted operating profits is:

17
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∞
ˆ
V COAL (P, C, B) = E0  max[min(Pt − Bt , Ct − Bt ), 0]e−rt dt

(29)

0

Note that when Bt = 0, the problem becomes equals to (5) due to the absorbing nature
of zero for the process Bt . Then, here we solve (29) for the general case when Bt > 0.
However, since the presence of the operating costs Bt in the instantaneous profits function
precludes the existence of a closed form solution, instead of relying on numerical solutions,
we proceed by assuming that the investor adopts a simplified strategy. In the specific, we
assume that, as it was for the previous cases, the investor chooses not to generate power
when Pt and/or Ct are higher than Bt , while it produces if both Pt and Ct are greater than
Bt . This identifies 4 regimes: P ≥ C > B, B ≥ C, C > P > B and B ≥ P . In these
regimes it is possible to provide analytical solutions for V COAL (P, C, B) as a proxy of (29).
The following Proposition summarizes the solution:

Proposition 3. The NPV of the investment in a Coal power plant can be approximated
by:
ΠCOAL (P, C, B) = −I COAL + K + V COAL (P, C, B)
with
 COAL
V
(P, C, B)


 1COAL
V
(C,
B)
2
V COAL (P, C, B) =
COAL
V
(P, C, B)


 3COAL
V4
(P, B)

if
if
if
if

P ≥C>B
B ≥ C and (C − B) < (P − B)
C>P >B
B ≥ P and (P − B) < (C − B)

(30)

and
V1COAL (P, C, B) =

C
B
C 1+η2 B −η2 (31)
−
+ ACOAL
P −η1 B η1 +1 + ACOAL
P −η1 C 1+η1 + ACOAL
21
11
12
r − µc
r

V2COAL (C, B) = ACOAL
B + ACOAL
C 1+η1 B −η1
(32)
31
32
P
B
COAL
COAL −η1 η1 +1
COAL 1+η2 −η2
COAL 1+η2 −η2
V3
(P, C, B) =
−
+ B11
P
B
+ B21
C
B
+ B22
C
P
(33)
r − µp
r
COAL
COAL −η2 1+η2
V4COAL (P, B) = B31
B + B32
P
B

(34)

Where the constants are:
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r + η 2 µp
,
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µp )
r − (1 + η1 )µc
−
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µc )
r − η 2 µp
−
,
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µp )
r + η 2 µp
−
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µp )
r − (1 + η1 )µc
−
,
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µc )
r − (1 + η1 )µc
−
,
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µc )

ACOAL
=
12

ACOAL
= −
11
ACOAL
=
21
ACOAL
=
31
COAL
B11
=
COAL
=
B21
COAL
B31
=

and

η1 = −

η2 = −

1 µc − µp
+
2 σc2 + σp2



1 µc − µp
+
2 σc2 + σp2



(35)
(36)

ACOAL
=
32

(1 − η1 )µp
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µp )

(37)
(38)

s
+
s
−

r − µc + η2 (µp − µc )
(η2 − η1 )(r − µp )(r − µc )

r − µc + η1 (µp − µc )
(η2 − η1 )(r − µp )(r − µc )
η 1 µc
=−
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µc )

COAL
B22
=

(39)

COAL
B32

(40)

1 µc − µ p
+
2 σc2 + σp2

2

1 µc − µ p
+
2 σc2 + σp2

2

+

2(r − µc )
>0
σc2 + σp2

+

2(r − µc )
<0
σc2 + σp2

with
1 2
µp = µ P − µB + σ B
2
σp = σP − σB
1 2
µc = µ C − µB + σ B
2
σc = σC − σB

(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)

Proof: See Appendix C
Though the model is more complicate, it is worth to note the symmetry with Model 1.
COAL = B V RE .
That is, if B = 0 the model collapses to M1, where ACOAL
= AV RE and B22
12
Thus, the terms where B > 0 indicate the effect of the price of coal on the value of the power
plant. For example, V2COAL (C, B) = ACOAL
B + ACOAL
C 1+η1 B −η1 and V4COAL (P, B) =
31
32
COAL
COAL
−η
1+η
B31
B + B32
P 2 B 2 represents the value of the power plant in the idle state
regime with the possibility of restarting when C or P respectively increase above B.
On the contrary, V1COAL (C, B) and V3COAL (C, B) represents the two regimes in which
the production plant is operating. In particular, the first regime represents the case in
C
which the price cap induced by CRM is binding, i.e. P ≥ C > B. Thus, r−µ
− Br gives
c
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the expected operating profits if the price cap effect was binding forever. The third regime
corresponds to the case in which the price effect is not binding, i.e. C > P > B. In this
case the expected operating profits are given by the discounted value of electricity price,
P
B
r−µc , minus the discounted value of power plant costs, namely, the cost of coal. r . The
second part of these equations, ACOAL
P −η1 B η1 +1 +ACOAL
P −η1 C 1+η1 +ACOAL
C 1+η2 B −η2
11
12
21
COAL P −η1 B η1 +1 + B COAL C 1+η2 B −η2 + B COAL C 1+η2 P −η2 , represents the possibility
and B11
21
22
to fall into regime 3 and regime 1, respectively, or the possibility to switch off the power
plant and get into regime 2 or 4.
In section 5.3 we discuss the signs of these constants. We shall also provide the net
present value of the investment. Moreover, since Model 3 is the one that encompasses the
other two models as special cases, we shall also evaluate each of the four possible regimes,
assuming different possible values for the power price, the price cap and the level of the
cost. Finally, we conduct some sensitivity analyses to show how the value of the plant
changes in relation to µB and σB in all four regimes.

5
5.1

Data and results
Empirical data and parameters estimation

We start by calibrating the models to real data, using data of the Italian power prices
and costs. In particular, we take the Italian wholesale single national power price - PUN
(Prezzo Unico Nazionale - in Italian) 19 from 2009 to 2019 as a proxy for the dynamics of
Pt ; the Natural Gas TTF Spot Price20 from 2008 to 2019 for Ct ; the COAL API2 Futures
21 from 2015 to 2019 for B . All three time series have been analysed following the same
t
procedure and considering monthly average prices.22 First, we test whether the monthly
averages of the three time series considered follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM)
by adopting a Dickey Fuller (DF) unit root test. Then, we proceed by estimating the trend
and uncertainty parameters, µ and σ. 23
19

Source: GME - Gestore Maercati Energetici ( https://www.mercatoelettrico.org)
Source: Eikon Refinitiv
21
Source: Investing (www.investing.com)
22
The sample is limited to the end of 2019, excluding the COVID-19 period. and the price
turmoils due to the Ukrainian war contingencies.
23
t
) with {Y = P, C, B}, the monthly log-returns of the three variables
Let us define aY,t = ln( YYt−1
p
considered. We can estimate the volatility term as σY = V ar(aY,t ). The drift term, µY , of PUN
20

σ2

and API2 was estimated by adopting the following relation µY = aY,t + 2Y with {Y = P, B}
and where aY,t is the monthly log-returns mean. The drift term of Natural Gas was estimated by
adopting the linear regression log(Ct ) = c + µC t + t . The different procedure adopted derive from
the need to provide the best possible estimate, on the basis of the available data.
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Both monthly and yearly drift and diffusion terms are computed. Details of the
procedure are reported in Appendix D. The results of parameter estimations for the dayahead electricity price P , the natural gas price C and the carbon price B are summarized
in Table 1.

GBM
Variable
Pt
Ct
Bt

Time series
PUN
TTF Spot Price
API2 Futures

DF
-2.93
-1.89
-0.94

µ
monthly
-0.0642%
-0.0499%
0.0801%

yearly
-0.7708%
-0.5989%
0.9619%

σ
monthly
10.78%
10.61%
7.08%

yearly
37.37%
36.75%
24.53%

Table 1: Dickey Fuller test results and GBM parameters estimation.

5.2

Model 1 and Model 2 - Numerical results and Sensitivity
analysis

In this section we calculate the values for Model 1 and 2. Unless differently stated, we use
the figures for the drift and volatility provided above. We adopt r = 5% as the (yearly)
risk-neutral discount factor (see Tan et al. (2020), Fu-Wei et al. (2022)) and set α = 50%
in Model 2. Table 2 summarises the parameters adopted for the analysis. Note that for
current values of price and cost we choose P = 59.21 and C = 19.39,that correspond to
the mean value of the time series of the PUN and the Natural Gas, respectively. Since
these prices are hourly (Euro/MWh), in order to calculate figures on a yearly basis they
are converted in Euro/MWy by multiplying them by 8760 (the number of hours in one
year). In the last two rows of Table 2 we provide the results of calibration of the two
models. Note that since P > C, we are in the first regime of Equation (6) for Model 1 and
Equation (14) for Model 2, respectively.
Note that V1V RE is higher than V1CCGT . The main reason is that, differently from
Model 1, in Model 2 there are generation costs which decrease the total operating profits
of the power plant. Finally, the switching values correspond to AV RE C 1+β1 P −β1 for Model
1 and ACCGT
C 1+β1 P −β1 for Model 2. We observe that both values are negative.
1
This is consistent with the fact that they represent the possibility to fall into the regime
where revenues are reduced because of a very low price, i.e. a price below the price cap.
The next subsection presents a graphical sensitivity analysis, per each model, showing how
values change depending on the drift and the volatility parameters.
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Model 1
r
P
C
µP
µC
σP
σC
α
V
Switching value

Model 2
5
59.210 *8760
19.386 *8760
-0.771
-0.599
37.37
36.75
50

1701551
-1331600

722595
-793980.5

(%)
(Euro/MWy)
(Euro/MWy)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(Euro/MW)
(Euro/MW)

Table 2: Model 1,2 - parameters adopted and calibration results.
Model 1: VRE coupled with an efficient ESS
Starting from the analytical solution in section 4.1, we are first interested in the sensitivity
of the two constants AV RE and B V RE to changes in the drift parameters for both P and
C. Note that we constraint acceptable values for µp and µc such that r − µp > 0 and
r − µc > 0, in order to obtain meaningful solutions for the equation (7) of AV RE and (8)
of B V RE . Consequently, we constraint the range of µp and µc to [−0.2, 0.049]. This will
be maintained for all analyses unless differently stated.
As expected, both constants show negative values as the drifts change. It means that in
both regime 1 and regime 2 the present value of the operating profits, V V RE , decrease
because of the CRM. As said before, the reason is that with a CRM electricity prices are
capped, and this is a constraint on the expected flow of revenues. Note that B falls as
µp rises, while it remains roughly unchanged in relation to variations of µc . This is as
expected, given that falling into regime 1 from regime 2 implies losing the possibility of
having extra revenues accruing from P , because of the price cap effect. Similarly, A falls
as µC rises since it increases the possibility of falling into regime 2, in which revenues are
capped.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of Avre and B vre with respect to r − µP and r − µC .
Let us consider now how the value V V RE changes depending on the drift and the
volatility parameters of both the day ahead electricity prices and the marginal cost of the
marginal technology. For brevity we reported here for Model 1 and 2 just the representation
of V V RE in the first regime, where P > C.
Both plots in the Figure 5 are based on the analytical equation (6). The graph on the left
hand side displays V1V RE as a function of the drift terms µp and µc . In this case, the Value
function V V RE is a convex curve and it is positive correlated with the both drift terms.
This implies that the expected present value of the operating profits accruing from the
price (eventually capped) more than compensate the negative switching effect as the price
and the cap rises, and this explains the behavior of the value function. The graph on the
right hand side show how V V RE changes in relation to the variation of volatility terms σc
and σp . In this case, V V RE is a concave function and it is negative correlated with both
volatility terms. It means that the investment value decreases when the uncertainty about
the two underlines (the electricity price and the price cap opportunity cost) increases.
Such a result deserves an explanation. Indeed, if we were to look at the investment in
a power plant as a real option, namely, the option to gain from the selling electricity in
the market, we would expect to see a positive impact of uncertainty on the value of the
investment, as for any option. Our analyses shows that the opposite holds true when there
is a CRM. Being the latter a price cap on the revenues means that the investor cannot
benefit from the price spikes, while still bears the possible falls due to price drops. This
explains the negative impact of the uncertainty on the present value of the investment.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity of V V RE with respect to drift and volatility of P and C in the
first regime (P > C).
Model 2: Efficient CCGT
In this section, looking at the analytical equations of Model 2 given by ( 18), (19), (20) and
(21) in section 4.2, we first evaluate the sensitivity of the four constants to r −µp and r −µc .
Note that, differently from Model 1, there is an additional parameter α that corresponds
to the share of C that measures the production costs of the CCGT power plant. The
results are presented in Figure 6. As expected, constants ACCGT
and B2CCGT are negative
1
while ACCGT
and B3CCGT are positive. In particular, B3CCGT represents the value of the
2
possibility to start selling again power when the plant is in regime 3. Since in this regime
the plant is not earning revenues, the possibility to start again the production has clearly
a positive impact on the value. Note that it rises as µP and µC increase (r − µP and r − µP
reduces). ACCGT
measures the possibility to fall into regime 1 when the plant is in regime
2
2. Also in this case, the value is positive since in the first regime there is no price cap effect,
while it affects revenues in regime 2. A similar rationale to the case before explains why
ACCGT
is negative, since it measures the possibility to fall into regime 2 when the plant
1
is in regime 1. For both ACCGT
and ACCGT
the value rises as µC increases, and they are
1
2
hardly sensitive to change of the drift of P . Finally, B2CCGT represent the opportunity to
fall into regime 3 in which the plant is idle and it does not earn revenues, which implies
that the corresponding switching value is negative. It decreases as µP rises, and it is hardly
sensitive to changes in µC , a behavior that is meaningful taking into account that in regime
2 revenues are determined by P (which is below C) and are lost when going into regime
3. Comparing the value of the constants with those of Model 1, we see that the constant
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AV RE shows a level twice as high as the constant ACCGT
; this is due to the presence of
1
the own generation costs that shrink its value. The constant B2CCGT is instead identical
to B V RE of Figure 4. Indeed, their equations are exactly the same. Finally, it should be
noted that the absolute value of the constant B3CCGT is approximately more than ten times
smaller than that of the other three constants.

Figure 6: Sensitivity of Accgt
1 ,

ccgt
2 ,

B2ccgt and B3ccgt with respect to r − µP and r − µC

Let us focus now on the sensitivity of V CCGT to µp and µc , and to σp and µc ,
respectively. The plots displayed in Figure 5, that are based on the analytical equation (
14), are similar to the ones in Figure 5. The main difference is that now the value is lower;
this is due to the fact that in this model there are generation costs that decrease the firm
operating profits.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity of V ccgt with respect to drift and to volatility parameters of P
and C in the 1st regime (P > C).

5.3

Model 3 - Numerical results and Sensitivity analysis

In this section we first present the calibration of the value for Model 3, and then the
sensitivity analyses. The parameters adopted and the calibrations results are reported in
Table 3. We assume that B corresponds to the average price of the entire Coal API2 time
series; as before, the value is converted in euro using an average conversion rate (1.097 dollar
per euro) and then calculated as Euro/MWy. The drift and volatility terms considered
yearly
, respectively. In addition, since Equation (30) is based on the ratio
and σB
are µyearly
B
P/C, we have now to consider also µp , µc , σp and σc .
The result of calibration is reported in the last box of the Table 3. Since B ≥ C and (C −
B) < (P − B), we are in the second regime. It is interesting to note that the value V
is higher than the ones obtained for Model 1 and Model 2. The reason is that, in the
second regime, i.e. B ≥ C and (C − B) < (P − B), the power plant is idle since the
costs are higher than revenues. It is not convenient for the owner of the plant to generate
electricity. Thus the value of the investment in this case is given only by the switching
value, or A31 B + A32 C 1+η1 B −η1 , that is, the possibility that in the future the plant will
restart selling electricity. This will occur if either the cost will fall or the power price rise
(or both); in all cases, this will boost revenues (and since the cost will fall below the price
cap, which is set by the gas price, V of coal will be higher).
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r
P
C
B
µP
µC
µB
µp
µc
σP
σC
σB
σp
σc

Model 3
5
59.210 *8760
19.386 *8760
70.962 *8760 *1.097
-0.771
-0.599
-0.961
1.28
1.45
37.37
36.75
24.53
12.84
12.22

(%)
(Euro/MWy)
(Euro/MWy)
(Euro/MWy)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)

V

8865277

(Euro/MW)

Table 3: Model 3 - parameters adopted and calibration results.

We calculate now V COAL in all four regimes of the Equation (30). To do so, we
change the figures of the calibration accordingly. We highlight that this procedure provides
hypothetical yet plausible figures that can be applied to calculate each value. Either 20
Euro/MWh, 40 Euro/MWh, 50 Euro/MWh and 80 Euro/MWh are considered for P , C
and B, depending on the specific regime that is being simulated. Table 4 summarizes the
value of P , C and B adopted in each regimes, the corresponding figures obtained for V and
for the flexibility value24 . Interestingly enough, see that the value is at its highest value
in the second case, and it all accrues from a positive switching value. Even if in the first
case the highest electricity price is coupled to the lowest own cost, we see that it does not
provide the highest value due to the existence of a negative switching value, namely the
possibility to loose operating profits, which reduces the net present value.
24

Note that µB and σB are kept fixed to the estimated values adopted before.
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1st
P ≥C>B
P
C
B

80 *8760
50 *8760
20 *8760

V
Switching value

6723278
-2106109

Regime
2nd
3rd
B≥C
and
C>P >B
(C − B) < (P − B)
80 *8760
40 *8760
50 *8760
50 *8760
60 *8760
20 *8760
6867637
6867637

4289901
-1617231

4th
B≥P
and
(P − B) < (C − B)
40 *8760
50 *8760
60 *8760

(Euro/MWy)
(Euro/MWy)
(euro/MWy)

2462382
2462382

(Euro/MW)
(Euro/MW)

Table 4: Model 3 - P , C and B values adopted in each regimes and calibration
results.
Now we conduct some sensitivity analyses to show how the value change in relation to
µB and σB in all four regimes. We constraint r > µp and r > µc by fix a range on variability
for µB between −0.01 to 0.3 and for σB between 0.01 to 0.05 Results are displayed in Figure
8.
Let us start from the plots of regime 1 and regime 3 (i.e. the two regimes in which
power plant is producing). See that V COAL rises as the volatility increases, while it is
negatively correlated with the drift term. For the volatility, this is due to the fact that the
switching value is negative; as σB rises, σp and σc reduces and thus the negative impact of
the switching value reduces too. About the drift term, as the drift rise the impact of the
cost on the operating profits is higher, and this obviously reduces the value.
Let us consider now the plots of regime 2 and 4, that correspond to the two regimes in
which power plant is shut down. We know that in each of these two regimes the value (V )
is positive, as it represents a call option to enter in the market and restart the production.
So the effect of a decrease of σp and σc due to an increase of σB should be negative as well
as an increase of µB . On the basis of this, we observe that in regime 2 such a negative
effect can be counterbalanced by the positive effect on µp and µc , when σB is not big
enough. On the contrary, in regime 4 the negative effect of an increase in σB is not fully
counterbalanced by the positive effect of σB on µp and µc.
In addition, it should be noted that in all plots the Value tends to stabilize asymptotically
around a given value (negative for the first, second and third regime). Therefore, positive
effects of σB are higher for low values of µB .
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Figure 8: How the value function V coal of Model 3 change in relation to the variations
of µb and σb in the four regimes.

5.4

The social value of the investment

We conclude by measuring the value of the investment from the point of view of the whole
society by means of a total welfare function. This allows also ranking the investment
induced by the CRM in terms of how compatible they are with the energy transition
perspective. Recall that the energy transition requires capacity that reduces greenhouse
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gas emissions. It is possible to rank the emission across the three considered technologies
as 0 = E V RE < E GAS < E COAL , considering the average emission factors of power
production form coal, gas and assuming that VRE do not emit greenhouse gases. At the
same time, we know that investment costs differ across technologies, and can be ranked as
I M 1 > I M 2 > I M 3 . By considering the social cost of the emission, it is possible to translate
the emission of each technology into a cost of the emission ξ(E i ), i = V RE, CCGT, COAL,
and relate this with the cost and the value of the investments in a total welfare function:


W i = −I i + K + V i (·) − ξ(E i ) , i = V RE, CCGT, COAL
Clearly, different figures for costs (generation and social costs of carbon) and prices
provide different ranking. In what follows, we calculate the total welfare for each technology,
assuming the expected net present values derived for each model from the calibration
analyses presented above, displayed in Table 2 and 3. For K, we assume a value of
1,125,000 Euro/M W , which corresponds to the value of the CRM awarded to new capacity
in the Italian Reliability Option auction held in 2019. Fixed investments costs can have a
large variability. We assume the values presented in Bersani et al. (2022), using in-shore
wind power as a reference for the VRE (1,750,000 Euro/MW). For the storage part of
the investment in VRE we assume a value of 2,500,000 Euro/MW (Source: Minkea and
Tureka (2018); Poli et al. (2021)). While for gas and coal power plant we assume a value
of 1,000,000 Euro/MW and 2,000,000 Euro/MW, respectively (Bersani et al. (2022)). The
emission factors are based on the Italian average emissions from power plant, as provided
by Caputo (2017). They amount to 0.365 tCO2 /M W h for gas, and 0.899 tCO2 /M W h for
coal. Emissions are converted into values by means of a price per unit of emission which
measures the social cost of carbon. Its calculation is a complex activity, based on simulating
future paths starting from some integrated assessment model which dynamically replicates
the structure of an economy. The results, depend, ceteris paribus, on assumptions about
parameters’ weighting, uncertainty, risk aversion and discount and time preferences. As
a consequence, the results provide extremely different figures. Discussing all models and
corresponding evaluations goes beyond the scope of this paper 25 . We consider here a
commonly used reference, namely, the DICE model by Nordhaus (2017), who provides an
estimate of 33.87$ per ton of CO2 for the year 201826 . The results of the calculations for
the social cost of carbon provides the following figures (Euro/MW): ξ CCGT = 1969017,
ξ COAL = 4849716. The total welfare values are displayed in Table 5.

W V RE
-1423449

W CCGT
-1121422

W COAL
3140561

(Euro/MW)

Table 5: Total welfare for Model 1, 2 and 3.
25
26

For a compact review see Zhang 2021 Zhang et al. (2021).
Prices have been converted in euro using a 1.1 Euro-dollar conversion rate.
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It is interesting to see that with the assumed level of social cost of carbon, the CRM
induces a ranking in the investments such that the power generation form coal provides
the highest value, followed form gas and VRE. In other words, the ranking is the opposite
of the one that the energy transition would require. The reason is due to the low cost of
carbon, the high cost of investment in the VRE, and the high Net Present Value of the
investment in Coal that overtakes the one in Gas. The latter, ceteris paribus, depends
also on the fact that we are in regime 2 of Model 3, i.e., the Value of the investment
depend fully on the option value to restart production provided by the investment in the
coal baseload.27 Reducing the investment cost in VRE would not be enough to invert the
ranking. For instance, a value of 1076551 Euro/M W for the cost of storage would provide,
under the assumed figures for the other costs and prices, a null welfare value for the VRE:
W V RE = 0 but the total welfare would still imply that the society should choose to invest
in coal production (and even more the private investor, should not be called to pay for
the social cost of carbon, i. e., looking just at the private value of the investment). see
that the total welfare from the investment in gas yields a negative value. This is due to
both the cost of emissions, and the low value of the investment in the gas power plant.
The latter, in turn, depends on the high negative switching value. Recall that the latter
measures the loss in the expected net present value due to the existence of the rigidity and
the possibility of losses (or better of lower revenues) induced by the CRM. If one neglects
such a value, for instance by looking just at the expected book value of the investment
(expected operating profits plus capacity premium net of fixed operating costs), without
taking into account the value of the loss of flexibility due to the CRM, would obtain a higher
value of the investment (with the figures used here, it would be roughly null). Thus, the
rigidity due to the CRM is crucial to make explicit the negative social value of incentivizing
the investment in gas-fired power plants through a CRM. In order to induce the CRM to
provide a ranking of the investment that favour VRE, it would be necessary to both reduce
the cost of investment in this source and increase the carbon cost. For instance, with a
storage cost of 1076551 Euro/M W a price of 51 Euro/tCO2 would induce a switching of
the ranking in favour of the VRE. The graph below provides a graphical representation
of the social value of VRE and of COAL, for different levels of the cost of carbon, and
investment costs in VRE. We can immediately see that the lower the investment cost for
VRE the lower the carbon price for which the investment in VRE is to be preferred.
27

Interestingly enough, we note that at the time of the writing of this article, the natural gas
price spike coupled with difficulties in gas power supply from Russia have induced several European
countries, including Italy, to restart production from coal power plants that were kept idle. Even if
the reality is clearly more complex than a theoretical model, we take such an evidence as an indirect
confirm of what we show in the text.
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Figure 9: Social value W V RE and W COAL for different levels of the cost of carbon
and investment costs in VRE.

6

Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to investigate the value of investments in capacity financed
by a Capacity Remuneration Mechanism (CRM), by adopting a stochastic approach. In
electricity market, producers can be paid with a CRM based on both the availability to
generate electricity as well as the electricity produced. So the Net Present Value of a
technology under a CRM is accounted by its investment costs, a capacity premium and its
Value function.
In order to discriminate between capacity that favors energy transition and capacity that
hinders the technological evolution, we developed three analytical models to study the
Value of three different technologies: a capacity provided by Variable Renewable Energy
(VRE) source coupled an efficient Energy Storage System (Model 1); a thermal efficient
capacity that at the time of the investment is more efficient than the marginal power plant
(Model 2) and a brown capacity (Model 3). These technologies have different revenue
functions and different underlying stochastic variables to consider. In particular, their
Value function depends on the evolution of electricity prices, on the marginal cost of the
marginal technology and generation costs, that are uncertain. The three analytical models
developed therefore have an increasing level of complexity, from the simplest scheme of
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the VRE technology with two underlying stochastic variables (i.e. electricity prices and
marginal cost of the marginal technology) to the most complex one with three stochastic
variables (i.e. electricity prices, marginal cost of the marginal technology and generation
costs). For all three models, the Value function is composed by different regimes that
depend on the level of the variables considered.
In the last part of this work we performed models calibration and sensitivity analysis.
Results show that the presence of CRM shrink power plants revenues and as consequence
decrease the final Present Value in all three models considered. In our study we refer to
this as the price cap effect value and it is driven by the constants value.
In particular, the sensitivity analysis of Model 1 constants showed that they are always
negative in all regimes. In Model 2 instead the constant sensitivity varies in relation to
the regime considered. In the first regime, that correspond to the case in which electricity
prices are higher than the marginal cost of the marginal technology, is always negative; in
the third regime, that correspond to the case in which costs become so high that the plant
is shutted down, is always positive; while the two constants of the second regime display
an opposite sign.
Also, calibrations of Model 1 and 2 showed that the price cap effect value has a negative
impact on final Value. However, the Value resulting by calibrations of Model 1 is higher
than that of Model 2. This is probably due to the presence of generation costs in Model
2 that compress the revenues of the plant and consequently its Value. In addition, the
sensitivity of Value for Model 1 and 2 displayed a similar behavior: they are positive
correlated with drifts of the electricity prices and the marginal cost of the marginal technology
while are negative correlated with their volatility terms.
For Model 3 another approach was adopted as, differently from the other two models, it
has also stochastic generation costs. The Value in this case is composed of four different
regimes: two in which power plant is producing (first and third regime) and the other two
where it is idle due to too high generation costs (second and fourth regime). We studied
the sensitivity of Value in relation to the drift and volatility terms of generation costs in
all four regimes. Results show that the first and third regime have a similar path: they are
positively correlated with the volatility while are negatively correlated with the drift term.
Instead, in the second and fourth regime different behavior emerged that depends on the
magnitude and impact of input parameters, and in particular of the electricity prices and
marginal cost of the marginal technology drift and volatility terms. Also, the calibrations
of Model 3 showed that the price cap effect has a negative value and decreases the final
Value.
Finally, the value of the investment from the point of view of the whole society by means of
a total welfare function was provided. Results show that the ranking of three technologies
considered is the opposite of the one that the energy transition would desire. In order to
induce the CRM to provide a ranking of the investment that favours energy transition, it
would be necessary to both reduce investment costs in VRE and increase carbon emission
costs.
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In our study we adopted Italian data for electricity prices and CRM ex-ante awards in
order to produce numerical results. This choice was driven by the fact that we desired to
study a market in which capacity remuneration is already in place.28 Anyway, our results
can be applied to different markets providing different investment and social values.
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Appendixes
A - Poof of Proposition 1
Defining by V 2 (P, C) the value of the investment in the region where P < C, i.e., whenever
the price cap effect is not binding, it must satisfy the following Bellman equation:
rV 2 (P, C) = P +

Et (dV 2 (P, C))
, for P < C
dt

(45)

Over a time interval dt, the total expected return on the investment opportunity, rV 2 (P, C)dt,
is equal to its expected rate of capital appreciation. Using Ito’s Lemma the above no
28

Nevertheless, recently Terna - the Italian TSO - has launched two big capacity auctions, i.e.
in November 2019 and in Febrarury 2022. In particular, the 06/11/2019 Terna launched the first
capacity auction for the capacity deliver in 2022 for the italian market. Then, the 21/02/2022
Terna opened the second capacity auction for the capacity deliver in 2024.
https://www.terna.it/it/sistema-elettrico/pubblicazioni/news-operatori/dettaglio/
esiti-asta-madre-2022-mercato-della-capacita
https://www.terna.it/en/electric-system/publications/operators-news/detail/
capacity-market-results-main-auction-2024 .
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arbitrage condition can be written as the Bellman equation:
1
1 2 2 2
rV 2 (P, C) = P + µP P VP2 + σP2 P 2 VP2P + µC CVC2 + σC
C VCC
2
2

(46)

2 are the first and second derivatives of V 2 (P, C) with respect
where VP2 , VP2P , VC2 and VCC
to P and C respectively.
Eq. (46) captures the relationship between the two stochastic variables, P and C. Since
the market value represents an homogeneous structure we are able to write the objective
2
2
function V 2 (P, C) as a function of the ratio x = C
P and write V (P, C) = Cv (x) . Using
the definition of x, we convert the partial differential equation ( 46) as:

2
(r − µC )Cv 2 (x) =P + vx2 (x)((σP2 − µP )P x2 + (µC + σC
)Cx)
1 2
1
2
2
2
+ σP P x3 vxx
(x) + σC
Cx2 vxx
(x)
2
2

(47)

where:
C
) = −x2 vx2 (x)
P2
1
= v 2 (x) + Cvx1 (x) = v 2 (x) + xvx2 (x)
P
1
2 1 2
3 2
= 2x vx (x) + x vxx (x)( )
P
P
2 2
1
2
=
v (x) + xvxx (x)
P x
P

VP2 = Cvx2 (x)(−
VC2
VP2P
2
VCC

Let consider the homogeneous part of (47). Dividing both parts by C we obtain an ordinary
differential equation for the unknown function v 2 (x):
1 2
2
2
(r − µC )v 2 (x) = (µC − µP + σC
+ σP2 )xvx2 (x) + (σC
+ σP2 )x2 vxx
(x)
2

(48)

A general solution for (48) is
v 2 (x) = A2 xβ1 + B2 xβ2
where:

β1 = −

β2 = −

1 µC − µP
+ 2
2 σC
+ σP2



1 µC − µP
+ 2
2 σC
+ σP2



s
+
s
−

(49)

1 µC − µP
+ 2
2 σC
+ σP2

2

1 µC − µP
+ 2
2 σC
+ σP2

2

+

2(r − µC )
2 + σ2 > 0
σC
P

+

2(r − µC )
2 + σ2 < 0
σC
P

are the positive and negative roots of the fundamental quadratic equation:
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1 2
1 2
(σC + σP2 )β 2 + (µC − µP + (σC
+ σP2 ))β − (r − µC ) = 0
(50)
2
2
Adding a linear particular solution for (48), the value function V 2 (P, C) can thus be
expressed as:
P
+ CA2 xβ1 + CB2 xβ2 for P < C
(51)
V 2 (P, C) =
r − µP
See that the terms CA2 xβ1 + CB2 xβ2 , capture the value of the possibility of entering into
the second regime, i.e., of having the price cap effect binding. Following the standard
procedure, we impose proper boundary conditions to rule out some implausible solutions.
The first boundary condition for the valuation PDE is given when x → ∞ , that is to say,
either the electricity day-ahead price tends to zero or price cap tends to infinite. In this
case there is no possibility of having the price cap effect binding. Thus, the value of being
P
into that regime vanishes. In other words, when limx→∞ V 2 (P, C) = r−µ
. Thus, for the
P
first regime P < C, we set A2 = 0 and obtain:
P
+ CB2 xβ2
r − µP
P
+ B2 C 1+β2 P −β2
=
r − µP

V 2 (P, C) =

(52)

Let’s know indicate as V 1 (P, C) the value of the investment when the price cap effect is
binding, i.e., when P ≥ C,. It must satisfy the following Bellman equation:
Et (dV 1 (P, C))
P ≥C
(53)
dt
Following the same rationale as before, the value function V 1 (P, C) can be expressed as:
rV 1 (P, C) = C +

V 1 (P, C) =

C
+ CA1 xβ1 + CB1 xβ2 for P ≥ C
r − µC

(54)

The terms CA1 xβ1 + CB1 xβ2 captures the value of entering into the second regime, i.e,
having the price cap effect not binding. As before, we consider two boundary conditions.
The first one is x → 0, i.e., the electricity day-ahead price tends to infinite or the price cap
effect to zero. In this case there is no possibility of entering into the other regime, thus
C
. This implies that when
its value vanishes. In other words, when limx→0 V 1 (P, C) = r−µ
C
P ≥ C we can set B1 = 0, i.e.:
C
+ CA1 xβ1
r − µC
C
=
+ A1 C 1+β1 P −β1
r − µC

V 1 (P, C) =

(55)
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Summing up, we get:
V (P, C) =

(
V 1 (P, C) =
V

2 (P, C)

=

C
r−µC
P
r−µP

+ A1 C 1+β1 P −β1

for P ≥ C

C 1+β2 P −β2

for P < C

+ B2

(56)

We aim to study the sign of the two switching values, and for this we calculate the
explicit expressions of A1 and B2 . In order to do so, we solve for the level of x = 1 which
would make the investor indifferent from being into one regime (P ≥ C) or the other
(P < C). Such a level is C
P = 1, which allows determining the constants A1 and B2 by
imposing the Value Matching (VM) and the Smooth Pasting (SP) conditions:
P
C
+ B2 C 1+β2 P −β2 =
+ A1 C 1+β1 P −β1
r − µP
r − µC
1
− β2 B2 C 1+β2 P −β2 −1 = −β1 A1 C 1+β1 P −β1 −1
r − µP
(1 + β2 )B2 C β2 P −β2 =

1
+ (1 + β1 )A1 C β1 P −β1
r − µC

Solving the system we obtain:
(r − µC ) + β2 (µP − µC )
(β2 − β1 )(r − µP )(r − µC )
(µP − µC )β1 + (r − µC )
(β2 − β1 )(r − µP )(r − µC )

A1 =
B2 =
where

(57)
(58)

s

1 µC − µP 2 2(r − µC )
+ 2
β2 − β1 = −
+ 2
<0
2 σC + σP2
σC + σP2

Finally, defining A1 = AV RE , and B2 = B V RE we get the expression in the text.

B - Proof of Proposition 2
Following the same procedure as in the proof of Proposition 1, we are able to show that:


V1CCGT (P, C)




CCGT
V
(P, C) = V2CCGT (P, C)





V CCGT (P, C)
3

(1−α)C
1+β1 −β1
for Pt ≥ Ct
P
r−µC + A1 C
P
αC
= r−µ
− r−µ
+ A2 C 1+β1 P −β1 + B2 C 1+β2 P −β2
P
C

=

(59)

for αCt < Pt < Ct
= B3 C 1+β2 P −β2

for Pt < αCt
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The constants A1 , A2 , B2 , and B3 are determined by imposing the matching condition
and the smooth pasting condition. We start by computing the matching condition and the
smooth pasting condition between first and second regime in C
P = 1. After some algebraic
steps we get:
1
+ A1
r − µC

=

1
+ A2 + B2
r − µP

1
+ A1 (1 + β1 ) = A2 (1 + β1 ) + B2 (1 + β2 )
r − µC
1
− A2 β 1 − B 2 β 2
−A1 β1 =
r − µP

Then we compute the matching condition and the smooth pasting condition between the
1
first and the third regime in C
P = α . After some algebraic steps we get:
α
α
−
+ A2 α−β1 + B2 α−β2
r − µP
r − µC
−

α
+ A2 (1 + β1 )α−β1 + B2 (1 + β2 )α−β2
r − µC
1
− A2 β1 α−1−β1 − B2 β2 α−1−β2
r − µP

=

B3 α−β2

=

B3 (1 + β2 )α−β2

=

−B3 β2 α−1−β2

The system can be reduced to 4 equations in 4 unknown. The solution gives:
1
1
−
r − µP
r − µC
1
−A2 (1 + β1 ) − B2 (1 + β2 ) + A1 (1 + β1 ) = −
r − µC
α(µC − µP )
A2 α−β1 + (B2 − B3 )α−β2 =
(r − µP )(r − µC )
α
+ B2 α−β2 + B2 β2 α−β2 − B3 α−β2 − B3 β2 α−β2 =
r − µC
−A2 − B2 + A1

A2 α−β1 + A2 β1 α−β1

=

Solving the system we obtain:
A1
A2
B2
B3

(µP − µC )β2 + (r − µC )
(1 − αβ1 +1 )
(β2 − β1 )(r − µP )(r − µC )
β2 (µP − µC ) + (r − µC ) β1 +1
= −
α
(β2 − β1 )(r − µP )(r − µC )
(µP − µC )β1 + (r − µC )
=
(β2 − β1 )(r − µP )(r − µC )
(µP − µC )β1 + (r − µC )
=
(1 − αβ2 +1 )
(β2 − β1 )(r − µP )(r − µC )
=

(60)
(61)
(62)
(63)

= A1 , ACCGT
= A2 , B2CCGT = B2 and B3CCGT = B3 we get the
Finally defining ACCGT
1
2
expression in the text.
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C - Proof of Proposition 3
Dividing (29) by B , the two-dimensional value of (29) is :

∞
ˆ
v(p, c) = E0  max[min(pt − 1, ct − 1), 0]e−rt dt

(64)

0

where p =

P
B

and c =

C
B

are distributed as GBM:
dp
p
dc
c

=

µp dt + σp dWtp

with p0 = p

(65)

=

µc dt + σc dWtc

with c0 = c

(66)

2
2
, σp = σP − σB , µc = µC − µB + 12 σB
, σc = σC − σB .
and µp = µP − µB + 21 σB
As the presence of −1 in (64) plays the role of a running cost, the value v(p, c) is given
by a couple of optimal timing problem as:

 τ

ˆ
v op,M 3 (p, c) = max E0  min(pt − 1, ct − 1)e−rt dt + v nop,M 3 (pτ , cτ )e−rτ 
τ

(67)

0



v nop,M 3 (p, c) = max E0 v op,M 3 (pτ , cτ )e−rτ

(68)

τ

where the maximum is taken over stopping times as function of both p and c, that represents
the times of switching from the regime of operation (i.e. v op (p, c)), to the regime of inaction
(i.e. v nop (p, c)) and vice-versa. However, in contrast to the previous cases, the presence of
running costs preclude the existence of close form solutions for both v op (p, c) and v op (p, c)
and the optimal operating policy. That is, optimal operation provides for a period of inertia
to cover the running costs Detemple and Kitapbayev (2020a) Detemple and Kitapbayev
(2020b).
Therefore, in order to obtain a close solution for (64), we proceed assuming, symmetrically
with the previous cases, that the investor simply decides to stop producing when p and/or
c go below 1, while it produces when both p and c are greater than one. This identifies 4
regimes: p ≥ c > 1, c > p > 1, p ≤ 1 and c ≤ 1.
Let consider first the case when p ≥ c > 1. Defining with v 1 (p, c), the value of the plant
within this state is given by the solution of:
1
1
1
1
rv 1 (p, c) = c − 1 + µp pvp1 + σp2 p2 vpp
+ µc cvc1 + σc2 c2 vcc
2
2

for p ≥ c > 1

(69)

Similarly, defining with v 3 (p, c) the value when c > p > 1, this is given by the solution of:
1
1
2
2
rv 3 (p, c) = p − 1 + µp pvp2 + σp2 p2 vpp
+ µc cvc2 + σc2 c2 vcc
2
2

for c > p > 1

(70)
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Considering now the regime in which the power plant is idle. If p ≥ c > 1 this would
happen for the first time when c goes below 1, so the power plant will be idle for all value
of p ∈ (0, ∞). That is, indicating with v 2 (p, c) the value of the plant is given by the solution
of:
1
1
4
4
rv 2 (p, c) = µp pvp4 + σp2 p2 vpp
+ µc cvc4 + σc2 c2 vcc
2
2

for c ≤ 1 for all p ∈ (0, ∞)

(71)

In the same way, if c > p > 1, power plant stops production the first time that p goes below
1 and remains idle for all value assumed by c ∈ (0, ∞). Indicating with v 4 (p, c) the value of
the plant in this case, it is given by the solution of:
1
1
3
3
rv 4 (p, c) = µp pvp3 + σp2 p2 vpp
+ µc cvc3 + σc2 c2 vcc
2
2

for p ≤ 1 for all c ∈ (0, ∞)

(72)

Solving first the homogeneous part of both v 1 (p, c) and v 2 (p, c), and then adding a particular
solution for v 1 (p, c), we obtain:
v 1 (p, c) =

1
c
− + Â1 c1+η1 p−η1 + Â2 c1+η2 p−η2 for p ≥ c > 1
r − µc
r

(73)

and
v 2 (p, c) = Â3 c1+η1 p−η1 for c ≤ 1

where:

η1 = −

η2 = −

1 µc − µp
+
2 σc2 + σp2



1 µc − µp
+
2 σc2 + σp2



s
+
s
−

and p ∈ (0, ∞)

1 µc − µp
+
2 σc2 + σp2

2

1 µc − µp
+
2 σc2 + σp2

2

(74)

+

2(r − µc )
>0
σc2 + σp2

(75)

+

2(r − µc )
<0
σc2 + σp2

(76)

By proceeding in the same way, we are able to obtain v 3 (p, c) and v 4 (p, c). These are:
v 3 (p, c) =

p
1
− + B̂1 c1+η1 p−η1 + B̂2 c1+η2 p−η2 for c > p > 1
r − µp
r

(77)

and
v 4 (p, c) = B̂3 c1+η2 p−η2 for p ≤ 1

and c ∈ (0, ∞)

(78)

To determine the constants we compute the matching value condition and the smooth
pasting condition moving from one regime to the other. If both p and c are greater then
one, the plant moves from v 1 (p, c) to v 3 (p, c) when pc = 1. That is:
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1
+ Â1 + Â2
r − µc
1
+ (1 + η1 )Â1 + (1 + η2 )Â2
r − µc
−η1 Â1 − η2 Â2

=

1
+ B̂1 + B̂2
r − µp

= (1 + η1 )B̂1 + (1 + η2 )B̂2
=

1
− η1 B̂1 − η2 B̂2
r − µp

Let us now consider the case in which c becomes less than 1 (while p > 1 ). The plant stops
producing and the value becomes v 2 (p, c). However, within this regime, the state variable
that plays an important role in returning to produce is only c and not p. Thus, for any
given value of p, the matching value condition and the smooth pasting condition are:
1
1
− + Â1 p−η1 + Â2 p−η2 = Â3 p−η1
r − µc
r
1
+ (1 + η1 )Â1 p−η1 + (1 + η2 )Â2 p−η2 = (1 + η1 )Â3 p−η1
r − µc

Let us now consider the case where p becomes less than 1 (while c > 1). The plant is
switched off and the value becomes v 4 (p, c). In this regime, the state variable that plays the
role in returning to produce is p and not c. Then, for any given value of c, the matching
value condition and the smooth pasting condition become:
1
1
− + B̂1 c1+η1 + B̂2 c1+η2 = B̂3 c1+η2
r − µp
r
1
− η1 B̂1 c1+η1 − η2 B̂2 c1+η2 = −η2 B̂3 c1+η2
r − µp

The solution of the system is:
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ÂCOAL
1

=
=

ÂCOAL
2

=

ÂCOAL
3

=
=

B̂1COAL

=

B̂2COAL

=
=

B̂3

=
=

ACOAL
c−1−η1 + ACOAL
12
11
r + η2 µp
r − µp − (1 + η2 )(µc − µp )
−
c−1−η1 +
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µp )
(η2 − η1 )(r − µp )(r − µc )
r
−
(1
+
η
)µ
1
c
pη2
ACOAL
pη2 = −
21
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µc )
p η1
ACOAL
c−1−η1 pη1 + ACOAL
32
31
r − η2 µp
r(1 + η2 ) − (1 + η1 )(r − µp ) η1
−
c−1−η1 pη1 +
p
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µp )
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µp )
r + η2 µp
COAL −1−η1
=−
B11
c
c−1−η1
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µp )
COAL η2
COAL
B21
p + B22
r − µp − (1 + η1 )(µc − µp )
r − (1 + η1 )µc
pη2 +
−
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µc )
(η2 − η1 )(r − µp )(r − µc )

(79)
(80)
(81)
(82)
(83)
(84)
(85)
(86)

COAL η2 −1−η2
COAL −1−η2
B31
p c
+ B32
c
r − (1 + η1 )µc
η1 µc
pη2 c−1−η2 −
c−1−η2
−
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µc )
(η2 − η1 )r(r − µc )

(87)
(88)

Substituting and multiply for B , we obtain the expression in the text:
V1COAL (P, C, B) =

C
B
P −η1 B η1 +1
− + ACOAL
11
r − µc
r

(89)

+ ACOAL
P −η1 C 1+η1 + ACOAL
C 1+η2 B −η2
12
21
V2COAL (C, B) =ACOAL
B + ACOAL
C 1+η1 B −η1
31
32
V3COAL (P, C, B) =

for P − B ≥ C − B
P
∈ (0, ∞)
for C − B ≤ 0 and
B

P
B
COAL −η1 η1 +1
COAL 1+η2 −η2
− + B11
P
B
+ B21
C
B
r − µp
r
+ B22 C 1+η2 P −η2

(90)
(91)

for C − B>P − B

COAL
COAL −η2 1+η2
V4COAL (P, B) =B31
B + B32
P
B

for P − B ≤ 0 and

C
∈ (0, ∞)
B

(92)

D - GBM DF test
The PUN time series was downloaded from the GME website (Gestore Mercati Energetici)
at the following link https://www.mercatoelettrico.org/it/download/DatiStorici.aspx.
This is a time series of hourly prices and starts from 01/01/2009. The time series of gas
prices was obtained from the Eikon database. Specifically, these are the returns of the dayahead price of natural gas traded on the TTF29 (TTF Spot Price - Day-Ahead). In this case,
29

TTF or Title Transfer Facility is the virtual point of delivery within the National Gas
Transmission System
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they are time series of daily prices and starts from 01/12/2008. The API2 Futures time
series can be downloaded at the following link https://it.investing.com/commodities/
coal-(api2)-cif-ara-futures. The prices are daily and start from 01/01/2015.
Starting from these time series, for all of them monthly price averages were then calculated.
In Figure 10, 11 and 12 are represented the monthly average prices for PUN, TTF Dayahead Natural Gas and Coal (API2) Futures, respectively.

Figure 10: Monthly PUN prices

Figure 11: Monthly TTF Gas prices

Figure 12: Monthly API2 Futures prices
A Dicky-Fuller test (unit root test with constant) was applied in order to study if the
time series retrieved for P , C and B follow a GBM. The Dickey-Fuller test is normally used
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for testing the null hypothesis that a unit root is present in the auto-regression process of
the time series considered. The simplest version of the DF test is a simple AR(1) model
i.e. yt = ρyt−1 + ut where yt is the variable of interest, t is the time index, ρ is the coefficient
and ut is the error term. If ρ = 1 then a unit root is present, in this case the time series is
non-stationary. In our analysis we adopted the so called DF unit root test with constant,
i.e. yt = a0 + ρyt−1 + ut .
Starting from Equation 3, 4 and 26 and applying Ito’s formula, we can rewrite the three
equations as:

σP2
dt + σP dWtP
2


σ2
=
µC − C dt + σC dWtC
2


σ2
=
µB − B dt + σB dWtB
2


dlnPt
dlnCt
dlnBt

=

µP −

(93)
(94)
(95)

Then we can rewrite them as:
lnPt − lnPt−1

= a0 + δlnPt−1 + et

(96)

lnCt − lnCt−1

= b0 + δlnCt−1 + zt

(97)

lnBt − lnBt−1

= c0 + δlnBt−1 + kt

(98)

The null hypothesis is that lnPt , lnCt and lnBt have a unit root, H0 : δ = 0, while the
alternative hypothesis is H1 : δ < 0 . If H0 is accepted then the process is GBM.
In the three tables below are reported the results obtained for Pt , Ct and Bt respectively.
In particular:
• for Pt at a confidence level of 1%, the null hypothesis (H0 ) of the presence of a unit

root can be accepted since the critical value obtained is greater than the respective
critical value, −2.9333 > −3.46.
• for Ct , H0 at a confidence level of 10% can be accepted since the critical value obtained
is greater than the respective critical value, −1.8956 > −2.57.
• for Bt , H0 at a confidence level of 10% the hypothesis H0 can be accepted since the
critical value obtained is greater than the corresponded critical value, −0.938 > −2.58.
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